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15 February 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William G. Miller, Staff Director,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

FROM : [REDACTED] Chief, 25X1
Congressional Support Staff, NFAC

SUBJECT : SSCI Statement on A Team-B Team Exercise

Bill -

Dr. Bowie has asked me to convey the following points:

The basic statement is reasonably accurate in its representation of the A-B Team episode. There are two aspects of the statement which could be somewhat misleading, however:

Owing in part to the long gestation of this statement, it is not now as clear as it should be that this was an exercise conducted in one year, 1976, in connection with only one of the many NIEs that the Intelligence Community produces. I recommend that the Committee staff clarify this matter at two spots in the statement:

--page 1, paragraph 1. Add to end of paragraph
"and conducted during the preparation of the
1976 NIE on Soviet Forces for Intercontinental
Conflict."

--page 7, last paragraph, first sentence. Change
"The most recent NIE" to "The 1976 NIE on Soviet
Forces for Intercontinental Conflict."

Many of the Committee's recommendations call for procedures which the Intelligence Community has long practiced and/or which the DCI and D/NFAC are now adopting or strengthening. Thus, while not inaccurate in a strict sense, the recommendations may erroneously imply that the procedures are not what they are.

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On page 4 of Senator Wallop's separate views there is the statement that "while consciously refusing to entertain the Soviets' own conception of what they are about militarily, the authors of the NIEs have ended up conceiving of the Soviets' enterprise in terms of our own doctrine of MAD" (that is mutual assured destruction). While it is true that our comparisons of US and Soviet forces use indexes which tend to stress MAD criteria, the discussion of Soviet strategic conceptions in the 1976 NIE is absolutely clear that the Soviet conception stresses warfighting and war survival and does not regard mutual assured destruction as a satisfactory long-term relationship; e.g., paragraph 4 and 5 of the summary volume on page 18 (see attached). I am sure you would want to bring this matter to the attention of the drafter so that the inaccuracy can be removed.

25X1

Attachment: a/s

cc: D/NFAC
DD/NFAC
AD-M/NFAC
AD-S/NFAC
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NIO/S

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Excerpt from NIE 11-3/8-76 Summary Estimate, page 18:

4. The available open and classified Soviet literature indicates that the Soviets are committed to improving their capabilities for waging nuclear war. This commitment reflects a leadership consensus on the need to assure the survival of the Soviet Union in case of such a war and a military doctrine which holds that a nuclear war could be won. Although the Soviet leaders apparently accept mutual deterrence as a present reality in East-West relations, the US concept of mutual assured destruction has never been doctrinally accepted in the USSR. The Soviets do not see the present correlation of forces as desirable or lasting, or as a condition which would preclude major confrontations between the US and the USSR.

5. Soviet military doctrine calls for capabilities to fight, survive, and win a nuclear war. In the Soviet view, war-fighting capabilities constitute the best deterrent. Thus, Soviet doctrine emphasizes counterforce capabilities and the necessity to destroy an enemy's war-making ability, and also stresses active and passive defense measures to limit damage to the Soviet homeland. The extent of Soviet active and passive defense efforts contrasts sharply with that of the US.

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